Estimating a Collective Household Model with Survey Data on Financial Satisfaction by Rob Alessie et al.
RESEARCH INSTITUTE FOR QUANTITATIVE
STUDIES IN ECONOMICS AND POPULATION QSEP
   
ESTIMATING A COLLECTIVE HOUSEHOLD MODEL
WITH




QSEP Research Report No. 409September  2006
Thomas F. Crossley is a QSEP Research Associate and a faculty member in the McMaster
University Department of Economics. Vincent Hildebrand is a faculty member with the
Department of Economics, Glendon College, York University. Rob Alessie is a faculty member
with the School of Economics, Utrecht University. 
This report is cross-listed as No. 161  in the McMaster University SEDAP Research Paper Series.
 
The Research Institute for Quantitative Studies in Economics and Population (QSEP) is an
interdisciplinary institute established at McMaster University to encourage and facilitate
theoretical and empirical studies in economics, population, and related fields.  For further
information about QSEP visit our web site http://socserv.mcmaster.ca/qsep or contact Secretary,
QSEP Research Institute, Kenneth Taylor Hall, Room 426, McMaster University, Hamilton,
Ontario, Canada, L8S 4M4, FAX: 905 521 8232, Email: qsep@mcmaster.ca.  The Research
Report series provides a vehicle for distributing the results of studies undertaken by QSEP
associates.  Authors take full responsibility for all expressions of opinion.
ESTIMATING A COLLECTIVE HOUSEHOLD MODEL
WITH




QSEP Research Report No. 409 
 
 
Estimating a Collective Household Model  
with  





a, Thomas F. Crossley






Abstract:   We estimate a collective household model with survey data on financial 
satisfaction from the European Community Household Panel. Our estimates suggest that 
cohabitating individuals enjoy returns to scale in consumption that are towards the larger 
end of the range of estimates reported in the literature. They also suggest that the share of 
household income provided by the female partner is a significant determinant of her share 
of household consumption in most of the countries we study.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The unitary model of consumer behavior assumes the existence of a single household 
utility function. This sits uneasily with the methodological individualism of economics. 
Moreover, the unitary model has empirical implications – for example, that household demands 
and saving behavior are unaffected by the distribution of income within the household – that are 
overwhelmingly rejected by data.  
There are several ways to take the multiplicity of decision makers in a household into 
account, including both cooperative and non-cooperative approaches. However, the leading 
approach now seems to be “collective” models, pioneered by Chiappori (1988, 1992) and Apps 
and Rees (1988), and recently surveyed by Vermeulen (2002). The collective approach assumes 
only that intra-household decisions are Pareto efficient (in particular, it does not specify a 
particular bargaining structure). This turns out to be enough to generate testable restrictions. 
Moreover, with certain restrictions on preferences, intra-household allocation can be described by 
a sharing rule. 
The identification and estimation of the parameters of collective household models with 
data on household expenditures and/or (individual) labour supply is a difficult task. To date, there 
have been essentially two schemes for identification. The first is to assume that there is at least 
one assignable good. Typical candidates for an assignable good are leisure (Chiappori, 1994; 
Chiappori, Fortin and Lacroix, 2002), and men/women’s clothing (Browning et al., 1994). To 
assume that observed non-market time is private consumption of leisure is very unattractive if 2 
there is home production (Apps and Rees, 1997).
1  Private consumption of men’s and women’s 
clothing is observed only if members of a couple are indifferent to each other’s sartorial choices.    
In a recent paper, Browning, Chiappori and Lewbel (2003) develop an alternative 
estimation strategy. They show that by specifying a consumption technology and sharing rule, 
they can identify structural parameters (of individual preferences, the consumption technology 
and the sharing rule), essentially by comparing the shapes of demands between of men and 
women, living singly and in couples. However, it turns out that finding the structural parameters 
that optimally rationalize the differences in demands is a highly nonlinear, computationally 
intensive, problem. The authors report that estimates take a long time to converge, and that there 
are multiple local minima. This limits the number of specification checks and tests that they can 
perform.  
Our goal in this paper is to explore a third alternative, which exploits data that, to the best 
of our knowledge, has not yet been used for this purpose. In particular, we attempt to estimate a 
collective household model from panel data on individual subjective financial satisfaction.  The 
basic idea, which we lay out formally below, is as follows. When two single individuals move 
into cohabitation, their financial resources change in two ways. First, returns to scale in 
consumption mean that their potential joint consumption exceeds the sum of what they could 
individually consume living alone. Second, unless resources are shared perfectly equally, one 
individual’s consumption will rise by more than is implied by returns to scale, while the 
consumption of the other will rise by less (or could even fall).  Thus, because we observe 
individuals of different circumstances moving in and out of cohabitation, if we assume stable (but 
possibly heterogeneous) individual preferences and reporting behavior, we can infer something 
                                                 
1 Chiappori  (1997) demonstrates that it is still possible to proceed if all home produced goods 
can be freely bought and sold in the market. 3 
about the household consumption technology and sharing rule from observed changes in 
individual financial satisfaction.  
The use of subjective survey measures of economic wellbeing has been rising in recent 
years. Such measures have been repeated validated by psychologists, and are believed to be a 
reasonably proxy for “utility”. See Frey and Stutzer (2002) for a survey. We employ longitudinal 
data from the European Community Household Panel (ECHP), which contain the following 
question on subjective financial wellbeing: “How satisfied are you with your financial situation?” 
Responses are recorded on a 7-point scale.  Schwarze (2003) uses the answers to this question in 
the German Socio Economic Panel (which is a component of the ECHP) to estimate equivalence 
scales (effectively, the returns to scale in consumption). Kuklys (2003) performs a similar 
exercise on the British Household Panel Survey, which is also a component of the ECHP.
2 
However, neither author considers intra-household allocation (implicitly assuming that 
consumption is equally allocated in the household.) Bonke and Browning (2003) conduct a cross 
sectional analysis of this question in the Danish component of the ECHP. Their focus is intra-
household allocation. They show that husbands and wives differ in their financial satisfaction and 
that relative income is an important correlate of within-household differences in satisfaction. This 
is important evidence against the income-pooling implication of the unitary model. However 
Bonke and Browning do not exploit the panel nature of the data or attempt to estimate a structural 
model, as we do in this paper.  
We believe our approach adds significantly to the existing literature in several ways. First, 
because we use a very different kind of information than existing estimates of collective models, 
our estimates provide an independent check on previous results. Second, the procedure that we 
                                                 
2 Kuklys is particularly concerned with estimating the costs of disability. 4 
develop is very computationally manageable, particularly in contrast to the methodology of 
Browning, Chiappori and Lewbel (2003) (although at the cost of specifying a less rich household 
consumption technology). It also has modest data requirements. The low computational burden 
makes it feasible to try a variety of specifications and robustness checks, and to quickly generate 
estimates for a range of samples. The use of widely available data also facilitates the generation 
and comparison of estimates for different time periods and populations. For example, below we 
report estimates of returns to scale and sharing rule parameters for ten of the countries 
participating in the ECHP.  In turn, the ability to generate estimates from a range of samples, 
populations or institutional settings opens up possibilities for comparative research. To illustrate, 
we use our returns to scale and sharing rule estimates to calculate measures of income inequality 
among singles and couples for ten European countries in 2001. These calculations account for 
within-household inequality and we contrast them with measures that fail to account for within-
household inequality. We discuss other possible applications in our concluding section. 
Our estimates suggest that cohabitating individuals enjoy returns to scale in consumption 
that are towards the larger end of the range of estimates reported in the literature. They also 
suggest that, in many countries, the share of household income provided by the female partner is 
a significant determinant of her share of household consumption. This latter result contradicts the 
income pooling implied by the unitary model.  In our application we find that accounting for 
intra-household inequality results in modest increases in the Gini coefficients for the 10 countries 
we examine. The impact of accounting for intra-household allocation on measured inequality 
differs across countries, but not so much as to dramatically change the rank ordering of countries 
by inequality. 5 
The outline of the rest of the paper is as follows. In the next section we describe the 
European Community Household Panel survey, and the sub-sample of that data that forms the 
basis of our empirical work. We also take an unstructured look at the financial satisfaction of men 
and women, living singly and in couples, and at how financial satisfaction changes with changes 
in living arrangements. This helps to motivate the subsequent analysis. In Section 3 we develop 
the structural model that we subsequently use to interpret the data. We describe, in turn, 
individual preferences, the household consumption technology, and intra-household allocation. 
Section 4 discusses some econometric issues. Section 5 presents our main results, which are 
country-specific estimates of returns to scale in household consumption and of parameters of the 
sharing rule that determines household allocation. Section 6 reports our inequality estimates and 
Section 7 concludes. 
2. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
 
The European Community Household Panel Survey 
 
The European Community Household Panel survey (ECHP) is a standardized multi-
purpose annual longitudinal survey providing comparable micro-data about living conditions in 
the European Union Member States. The December 2003 release of the ECHP data used in this 
paper includes eight waves spanning the 1994--2001 time period. Over 60,000 households and 
130,000 adults across the European Union were interviewed at each wave.
3  
                                                 
3 The first wave covered all EU-15 Member States with the exception of Austria, Finland and 
Sweden. Austria joined in the second wave, Finland in the third, and Sweden in the fourth. 
However data for Sweden are not longitudinal, but derived from repeated cross-sections. In the 
periods covering the first three waves, the ECHP ran parallel to existing similar panel surveys in 
Germany, Luxembourg and the United Kingdom. From the fourth wave onwards, the ECHP 
samples were replaced by data harmonized ex post from these three existing surveys. The ECHP 
data were `cloned' backwards so that two versions of German, Luxembourg, and British data are 
available in the first three waves of the ECHP database.  6 
The topics covered in the survey include income, employment, housing, health, and 
education. A harmonized (E.U.-wide) questionnaire was designed at Eurostat. The survey was 
implemented by “National Data Collection Units” in member states. The public-use database is 
derived from the data collected in each of the Member States and is created, maintained and 
centrally distributed by Eurostat. 
Sample 
Not all of the countries represented in the ECHP have data suitable for our purposes, 
because of exceptions to the general design rules and missing information. We study ten 
countries: Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, France, Ireland, Italy, Greece, Spain, Portugal 
and the United Kingdom.
4 
 Our analysis is based on individuals living as a single individual or as a member of a 
couple (without children.) Couples may or may not be legally married; throughout we refer to an 
individual living as a member of a couple as “cohabiting.”  
A small number of individuals in same-sex couples were dropped from the data, as were 
individuals in households reporting zero household income (each of these restrictions eliminated 
less than 0.5% of the data). We also dropped observations for which there was not a usable 
response to the financial satisfaction question (less than 2% of the data). 
 A First Look at the Data  
Individual respondents to the ECHP (including multiple individuals in the same 
households) answered the following “Financial Satisfaction” question: 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
4 We dropped the German data because the in SOEP the financial satisfaction information was 
not available, and in the original ECHP sample has only waves. We dropped Sweden since the 
nature of our study requires longitudinal samples. With respect to the UK, we dropped the 3 
waves from the original ECHP sample and worked with the 8 waves of BHPS cloned data. 
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How satisfied are you with your present financial situation? 
1. not  at  all  satisfied 
2. largely  unsatisfied   
3. mildly  unsatisfied   
4. mildly  satisfied   
5. largely  satisfied   
6. fully  satisfied 
 
Note that respondents in the United Kingdom (who were participating in the British Household 
Panel Survey) answer a similar question with only 5 categories.
5  
To provide a sense of the data, and to motivate the subsequent analysis, we provide some 
descriptive statistics in Tables 1, 2 and 3. To keep the tables manageable, we focus on data from 
three countries: the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Spain. 
Table 1 documents, for each of these three countries, the responses to the above question 
among single men, single women, co-habiting men and co-habiting women. Again, the data are 
individuals living alone or with a just with a spouse or partner. The first panel, for the 
Netherlands, suggests that single men are more satisfied with their financial situation than single 
women. The same appears to be true in Spain (third panel) but less so in the U.K. (middle panel). 
In all three countries, cohabitation is associated with greater financial satisfaction for both men 
and women, but the differential appears to be larger for women. 
                                                 
5 The BHPS question is: 
How well would you say you yourself are managing financially these 
days? Would you say you are . . . 
Living comfortably..................................... 1 
Doing alright ............................................. 2 
Just about getting by.................................. 3 
Finding it quite difficult ............................ 4 
Finding it very difficult? ........................... 5 
Don't know ................................................ 8 
The scale is inverted to harmonize with the ECHP.  
 8 
Table 2 exploits the household structure of the data. Here we cross-tabulate the financial 
satisfaction of the male and female partner. The numbers presented are row percentages. So, for 
example, the top row of the first panel can be read as the percentage of cohabitating Dutch 
women whose partner was very dissatisfied with their financial situation that gave each of the 
responses (from very dissatisfied to very satisfied). There is clearly a strong correlation between 
partners’ responses to this question, but it is not a perfect correlation. In each country (panel) 
there are significant off-diagonal terms: partners differ in their reported financial satisfaction. 
One measure of agreement between two ratings is the Kappa statistic. This measure adjusts for 
the amount of agreement that would arise randomly. A value of 0 indicates the same agreement 
as would arise by chance. A value of 1 indicates complete agreement. The Kappa statistics 
reported at the bottom of Table 2 suggest that the degree of intra-household agreement is 
relatively similar in the three countries.  
Table 3 exploits the longitudinal nature of the data. For each country and gender, the 
distribution of year-on-year changes in the (categorical) measure of financial satisfaction are 
reported, for four different subgroups: those that remained single from one year to the next, those 
that moved to into cohabitation, those who moved out of cohabitation, and those in remained in 
cohabitation for one year to the next. These numbers should be interpreted with considerable 
caution. In particular, if one assumes (as is often assumed, and as we shall assume below) that the 
categorical responses are related to a continuous underlying latent index, it is not necessarily the 
case that the difference in the categorical indicators is monotone in the difference in the latent 
variables.
6 Nevertheless, interesting patterns are apparent. For example, movements out of 
                                                 
6 Note that out structural estimates (below) do not involve differencing the categorical data, and 
so do not suffer from this problem. 9 
cohabitation appear to be particularly associated with decreases in financial satisfaction for 
women in The Netherlands and in Spain. 
From this preliminary analysis of the data, we take four messages. First, partners view 
their finances differently, which is at least suggestive of unequal resource allocation within the 
household, and possible further evidence against the unitary model. This point has been made 
previously by Bonke and Browning (2003), based on their cross-sectional analysis of the Danish 
subset of the ECHP. Second, changes in financial satisfaction with changes cohabitation status 
are, on average, different for men and women. This is certainly a pattern that we would like to be 
able to interpret further. Third, the patterns in the data differ significantly across countries. This 
again suggests that further investigation may be fruitful. Finally, the patterns in the data are 
complicated. This suggests that a model is needed to interpret them.  
3. Model 
 
We now present our structural model. This is a collective household model, intended to 
capture both returns to scale in household consumption and unequal allocation within households. 
The model intentionally follows Browning, Chiappori, and Lewbel (2003) (BCL), although it is 
simpler than the model they develop in ways that will be indicated below.  
Individual Utility 
 
Individuals have (random) PIGLOG preferences. The indirect utility function for 
PIGLOG preferences is  
1
(log ( )) ( ) ( )log
()
Vx a p p p x
bp
αβ =− = + .   (1) 10 
We do not have price data, but can allow that prices will differ across countries and through time 
by allowing preference parameters (α  and β ) to be time and country specific. We also allow 
() ap and hence  () α p  to vary with observable individual characteristics (such as age and 
education), possibly a scalar unobservable characteristic (an individual specific, time - invariant 
effect), and an idiosyncratic time-varying error term.  Thus for individual i, living in country c at 
time t,  
() l n α βμ ε =+ + + ict ct ict ct ict i ict Vz x ,   (2) 
where  ict V is utility,  ict z is observable characteristics,  ict x is total private consumption and  
i μ is an individual specific effect and  ict ε  is the idiosyncratic time-varying error term. 
There are two key assumptions here. First, preferences are egoistic. Although there may 
be sharing and other sources of returns to scale (or, alternatively, congestion), individuals care 
about their own consumption.
7   
Second, (1) depends only on individual consumption and prices, and not on living 
arrangements directly (though the relationship between household income and individual 
consumption will depend on living arrangements, as we discuss below). Effectively we are 
modeling economic (or material) wellbeing and assuming that, if positive or negative utility is 
derived directly from cohabitation, such effects are additively separable from the consumption of 
goods and services. 
Household Income and Individual Consumption 
We assume that single individuals consume their (real) income
8: 
= ict ict xy .   (3) 
                                                 
7 We could allow for specific kinds of caring; the key assumption is that intrahousehold 
allocation can be described by a sharing rule. 
8 Inter-temporal issues are certainly important, but we abstract from them in this analysis. 11 
However, for couples, things are more complicated, in two ways. First, consumption of couples 
can exceed their combined income through sharing and other sources of returns to scale in 
households. Second, the total consumption of couples is divided between them according to a 
sharing rule. Thus for couples:  
1() η
− = ict ict ict x F y .   (4) 
Where ηictis the share of “Total expenditure” and the function 
1()
− F captures the returns to scale 
in household consumption in a general way. With returns to scale, 
1()
− > F yy , but congestion or 
other negative consumption externalities might give the opposite.) With respect to household 
returns to scale, we follow BCL in assuming a linear household consumption technology. 
However, because we will work with data on overall satisfaction (utility) and not with 
expenditure data (and relative prices), we are forced to assume a simpler version of the 
consumption technology. In particular, we can model “overall” returns to scale, but not 
substitutions induced by the price-like effects of different returns to scales in different goods.
9 
Thus we have: 
                                                 
9 BCL specify: 
12 12 () () =+ = Α + + ict ict ict ict ict zF qq qqa   
where  ict z is a (observable) vector of household consumption quantities  of n goods, 
1
ict q  and 
2
ict q  
are (unobserved) n-vectors of private consumption,  Α is an n x n nonsingular matrix and α  is 
an n-vector. The budget constraint is: 
  ' ≤ ict ict p zy ,  
where p is a vector of prices and  ict y is income (and observable scalar.) This structure nests 
familiar cases. For example, with Α diagonal and  0 a = , the setup is analogous to Barten scales 
though for a collective model (see BCL for further discussion). In their analysis, the elements of 
Αand α  are identified via the modeling of demands for the n goods, which is not feasible with 
our data. . Effectively, we assume that a = 0 and that Α is a diagonal matrix with identical 
elements A along the diagonal. Thus, we have an Engel scale rather than a Barten Scale. 
Assuming the budget constraint holds with equality we have: 12 












.   (5) 





















). The sharing rule depends on prices and income, and on variables, w, 
that affect the intrahousehold allocation. These are distribution factors in the terminology of (for 
example) Browning, Chiappori and Lechene (2003). Again, we do not have data on relative 
prices, but we can allow  () γ  to vary across countries and time. With respect to distribution 
factors, we focus on the (current) share of the first (female) partner’s income in household 
income, which we denote 
1 w .
10 Thus we specify: 
 
01 2 1 (,,) l n ct ct ct p yw y w γγ γ γ =+ +  (7) 
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10 We are estimating a static model on dynamic data. One possible motivation is that partners 
can’t commit. This would mean that the allocation at each point in time depends only the 
distribution factors at that point in time (see the discussion in Browning, Chiappori and Lechene, 
2003) 
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4. Empirical Implementation and Econometric Issues 
 
Combining equations (2), (3), (8) and (9) gives the indirect utility function, in terms of 
observables, for single men, single women and both members of a couple. For singles, 
 
() l n α βμ ε =+ + + ict ct ict ct ict i ict Vz y ,   (8) 
For female members of couples 
{ }
01 2 1 ln 01 2 1 ( ) ln ln(1 ) ln ln
ct ct ct yw
ict ct ict ct ct ct ct ict i ict Vz y w e y A
γγ γ α βγ γ γ με
++ =+ + + − + + − + + , 
 (9) 
and for male members of couples 
{ }
01 2 1 ln () l n ( 1 ) l n l n
ct ct ct yw
ict ct ict ct ict i ict Vz e y A
γγ γ α βμ ε
++ =+ − + + − + + ,   (10) 
To ease estimation we take one further step, which is to linearize 
01 2 1 ln ln(1 )
ct ct ict ct ict yw e
γγ γ ++ +  
around zero. We construct our data so that these variables have a mean of zero for each country 
(and the country specific means are subsumed in the constant). Thus the linearization is  
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This gives us an equation we could estimate if  ict V were observable. To proceed, we 
interpret responses to the “Financial Satisfaction” question as a measure of economic wellbeing 
or utility from the consumption of goods and services. Specifically, denoting financial 
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Thus, in the absence of unobserved individual heterogeneity ( 0 i μ = ), and assuming that the  ict ε  
are normally distributed, (14) could be estimated as an ordered probit model.  Note that we are 
assuming that wellbeing is interpersonally ordinally comparable (for further discussion, see 
Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters, 2004). 
  Unobserved Heterogeneity 
It is desirable, however, to allow for time-invariant, unobserved individual heterogeneity 
(0 i μ ≠ ) in preferences, or perhaps in reporting behaviour.
11 Our set up suggests a random effects 
ordered probit model. However, that model assumes the independence of  ict FS  given  i μ  and 
ict W ; intuitively this says that the unobserved, time-varying determinants of utility (captured by 
ict ε  in Equation 14) cannot be serially correlated. It is easy to imagine that there is some 
persistence in unobserved, time-varying determinants of utility, and so we wish to avoid 
imposing this assumption. A pooled ordered probit provides consistent estimates of Π up to 
scale without imposing this assumption. That is, we can estimate 
21 / 2 /(1 )
k
ct μ πσ +  under fairly mild 
conditions (normality of the disturbances,  ict ε ; observables,  ict W , uncorrelated with the individual 
specific effect i μ , and with the contemporaneous disturbance. See Wooldridge, 2002, section 
15.8). Fortunately, estimating the 
k π up to a scalar is sufficient to identify the structural 
                                                 
11 So long as this unobserved heterogeneity is in preferences, we are continuing to assume 
interpersonal ordinal comparability. 16 
parameters of interest ( A and the elements of γ ) - because these can be recovered from ratio’s of 
the 
21 / 2 /(1 )
k

















For further details, see the appendix.
12  
This estimation strategy does not allow for correlation between the unobservable 
individual effect  i μ  and observed covariates,  ict W . To relax this restriction, we follow the 
Mundlak (1978) version of the Chamberlain (1980) suggestion, and model the individual effects, 
i μ , as a linear function of the individual specific means of a subset of the right-hand side 
variables,  ict W . Denoting a subset of  ict W  (including the constant) by  ict w and the individual 
specific means of these variables by  ic w , our assumption is: 
  ic ic ic w μ δζ = +  (16) 
with  
2 |~ ( 0 , ) ic ic wN ζ ζ σ ,  1 ( ...... )' ic ic icT ww w = . Thus our formulation of latent, indirect utility 
becomes: 
  ict ict ct ic ic ict VW w δ ζε =Π + ++ (17) 
 
Again we estimate by pooled ordered probit in order to avoid assuming serial independence of 
the disturbances. The key reduced form parameters continue to be identified up to scale. A test of 
0 δ = is a test of the assumption that the individual effects are uncorrelated with observables. 
While the addition of the “Mundlak” terms,  ic w , relaxes somewhat the assumption that 
the individual effects are uncorrelated with observables, it does impose an additional restriction. 
In particular, the Chamberlain/Mundlak procedure requires strict exogeneity of the observables, 
                                                 
12 Parameters of the utility function (α andβ ), however, are identified only up to the scale factor. 17 
ict W . Strict exogeneity would imply, for example, that future cohabitation is uncorrelated with 
the unobserved determinants of current financial satisfaction.
13  
Recovering Structural Parameters 
Given the reduced form estimates, the structural parameters can be recovered with a 
minimum distance step. This also provides a useful over-identification test. Because the 
dimension of this maximization is the number of parameters, it is very fast. (See also the 
appendix.) 
5.  Results 
 
We now turn to estimating our simple collective model on ECHP data from ten European 
countries. The key structural parameters are the parameters of the sharing rule, and the parameter 
A, which captures household returns to scale. Before presenting our estimates, it is useful to 
consider some points of comparison.  
Note that with equal sharing ( 0.5 η = ) 2A is a traditional equivalence scale (divide 
household income by 2A to give the equivalent income for a single individual). The “original” 
OECD equivalence scale that gives a weight of 1 to the first adult and a weight of 0.7 to the 
second adult implies a implies a value for A of 1.7/2 = 0.85. The “modified” OECD equivalence 
scale  (deVos and Zaidi, RIW, 1997) gives a weight of 0.5 to the second adult and so implies a 





                                                 
13 While we think the case for these two estimation strategies is good, we did experiment 
(unsuccessfully) with other panel estimators for ordered responses. These included random 
effects ordered probit, random effects ordered probits with Chamberlain/Mundlak terms, and a 
procedure for implementing a fixed effects ordered logit suggested by Andersen (1973) (see also 
Das and van Soest, 1997). These estimators also require strict exogeneity.  18 
In a paper that shares some methodological aspects with our work, Schwarze (2003) uses 
financial satisfaction questions in the German Socio Economic Panel to estimate equivalence 
scales (but assumes equal allocation within households.) His estimates imply a value for A of  
0.61 to 0.63, which suggests larger returns to scale than  the OECD or “square-root” equivalence 
scales (the second adult gets a weight of approximately 0.25). It is a common finding that 
equivalence scales based on “subjective information” suggest larger returns to scales than 
equivalence scales based on demand system estimation or expert opinion. 
As noted above, our simple collective household model is similar to (thought somewhat 
less rich than) the model that Browning, Chiappori and Lewbel (2003) develop and then estimate 
on Canadian data (using methods quite different from our own.) BCL posit Barten scales, so that 
the returns to scale explicitly differ across goods, but they can, and do, calculate an “overall” 
return to scale from their estimates. Their estimates imply a value of A of 0.79. 
With respect to sharing rule parameters BCL find that a woman of the same age and 
personal income of her spouse, and median household income, enjoys a 65% share of potential 
household consumption. That the female share exceeds the male share reflects the fact couples’ 
demands are more similar to those of single women than to those of single men. BCL find that 
the female share is larger in richer households, but find no effect of the age difference between 
the female and her spouse or of the income share of the female. The finding that income shares 
do not affect intra-household allocation contradicts earlier findings by Browning et al., (1994). 
The earlier findings are based on a different identification strategy (a strategy that assumes that 
particular goods are assignable).  
  We begin by estimating Equation (14) by pooled ordered probit. This is the base model, 
without any Chamberlain/Mundlak terms to account for correlation between observables and 19 
unobservable individual effects. We estimate separately by country, and include a full set of time 
dummies. However to keep things manageable, we do not allow other parameters to vary over the 
8 years covered by the data. This amounts to assuming that relative prices do not differ 
substantially within countries over this period. Among the key variables in the specification 
captured by Equation (14) are household income and the female income share. Country specific 
means for these variables are reported in Table 4. Our observable utility shifters,  ict z , (which 
could also be interpreted as determinants of reporting behavior), are gender (a female dummy), 
education (captured by two dummy variables) and age and age-squared. 
Reduced form parameters estimates are reported in Table 5a. Reassuringly, financial 
satisfaction is increasing in income in all countries. However, in most countries, the effect of 
income is different for individuals living alone or cohabiting. Among cohabiting individuals, the 
female income share is a significant determinant of financial satisfaction, for both men and 
women, in all countries. These reduced for parameters are difficult to interpret however, so it is 
natural to move to our structural parameter estimates. These are presented in Table 5b.  
For most countries we get small but reasonable estimates of the returns to scale parameter 
A.  Note that a small value of this parameter indicates substantial returns to scale. A value of 0.5 
indicates that a couple’s potential total consumption is double their income; this in turn implies 
that all consumption is public. A value of 1 indicates no returns to scale; all consumption is 
private. The estimates of  A and associated confidences intervals are presented graphically in 
Figure 1.  A traditional “equivalence scale” is obtained by multiplying the parameter  A by two. 
This gives the value by which a couple’s income should be divided to give the income that a 
single person would require to have the same per capita total consumption. In only two countries 
(Netherlands and Belgium) are the theoretical restrictions on this parameter (0.5 1 A ≤≤ ) rejected 20 
by the data at conventional levels of statistical significance. The point estimates for Denmark and 
France also lie outside the theoretical range.  Among the other countries, the estimates range from 
0.526 (U.K) to 0.767 (Portugal); the implied equivalence scales range from 1.05 to 1.53. These 
estimates indicate substantial returns to scale.  For example, for every country but Portugal the 
estimated returns to scale exceed those implied by the “modified OECD” equivalence scale. 
Turning to the sharing rule parameters, we find that the female income share is a 
statistically significant determinant of consumption shares in seven of our ten countries.  The 
exceptions are the Netherlands, Belgium and Ireland.   In all ten countries the sign of the sharing 
rule coefficient on female income share is positive. This indicates that, holding income constant, 
an increased female income share raises the financial satisfaction of the female in a couple and 
lowers the financial satisfaction of her male partner. This seems to us to be strong evidence 
against the unitary model.  
Household income is a statistically significant determinant of the female share only in 
Denmark and the United Kingdom (and in Spain at the 10% level).  
To aid in the interpretation of these parameters, we calculate female consumption shares 
at mean household income and alternative assumptions about the female income share. In 
particular, we calculate the female’s share of total consumption if the couple has average income 
and the female share of income is 0.25, 0.5, 0.75 or the mean female income share for that 
country (from Table 4). These calculations are reported at the bottom of Table 5b.  Female 
consumption shares rise steeply with female income shares in some countries, notable Denmark, 
France, Spain and Portugal. The same relationship is notably flat in the Netherlands and Ireland.  
A striking feature of the results is that, in all countries, our estimates suggest the female 
share of total consumption is almost always greater than one half. 21 
Finally, we also note that the over-identification tests reject the null in all countries. This 
is perhaps to be expected. The fairly tightly specified model we are using to interpret the data is 
not parameter rich. 
These estimates, based on a pooled ordered probit, do not fully exploit the longitudinal 
nature of our data. In particular, all of the parameters are identified by both cross-sectional and 
longitudinal variation in the relevant variables. We therefore now turn to estimates based on the 
Chamberlain-Mundlak procedure described in the previous section (see especially Equations 16 
and 17).  
The “Mundlak” terms that we include are person-specific means of the couple dummy, 
and the couple-gender interaction. This means that the reduced-form coefficients on the couple 
dummy and the couple-gender interaction are identified only by within-person variation. In turn, 
this means that the returns to scale parameter  A is identified only by within- person variation (as 
it is recovered from these reduced form parameters.) We do not include person-specific means of 
income or income share variables. In our short panel, within-person variation in these variables is 
dominated by transitory income shocks and measurement error, and we did not think it advisable 
to estimate parameters only with such variation. The consequence is that other structural 
parameters, notably the sharing rule parameters, continue to reflect both between- and within –
person variation. We nevertheless feel that this specification represents the limit of what can 
reasonably be asked of the data.  
The resulting reduced form estimates are presented in Table 6a and the corresponding 
estimates of the structural parameters are presented in Table 6b. Table 6a also reports (in the 
second to last row) tests of the joint statistical significance of the person-specific means 
(“Mundlak terms”). These are statistically significant at the 5% level in half of our countries 22 
(Denmark, Belgium, France, Ireland, and United Kingdom) and at the 10% level in a further three 
(Denmark, Greece and Portugal). These results suggest that the individual effects are correlated 
with cohabitation status.  
Turning to the resulting estimates of the structural parameters (Table 6b), we see that the 
returns to scale parameter,  A, is now somewhat less precisely estimated. The estimates of  A and 
associated confidences intervals are presented graphically in Figure 2. It is now the case that the 
theoretical restrictions on this parameter (0.5 1 A ≤ ≤ ) are not rejected by the data for any country. 
However, the data do contain useful information about this parameter, as large parts of the 
theoretical range are excluded in many countries. The estimates again suggest quite large returns 
to scale. Only for Portugal, Ireland and Greece do the estimated returns to scale exceed those 
implied by the “modified OECD” equivalence scale. 
Turning to the sharing rule parameters, we find that the female income share is 
statistically significant at the 5% level in five countries (Denmark, France, Italy, Greece, and 
Spain) and at the 10% level in a further two (Portugal and the U.K.). Again the sign in all 
countries is positive, indicating that, holding income constant, an increased female income share 
raises the financial satisfaction of the female in a couple and lowers the financial satisfaction of 
her male partner.   
With these new estimates we repeat our calculations of female consumption shares at 
mean household income and alternative assumptions about the female income share. The results 
are presented in the bottom of Table 6b and also in Figure 3. In Figure 3, countries are arrayed 
along the horizontal axis. The female share of a couple’s total consumption is measured on the 
vertical axis. This is calculated in three ways, all employing country-specific estimates of the 
sharing rule parameters. First, we assume that the female contributes 25 percentage of household 23 
income (plotted as a circle.); second, we assume that the female contributes 75 percent of 
household income (plotted as a triangle); and finally, we set the female contribution to household 
income equal to the country mean (plotted as a diamond). In all three cases, household income is 
set to the country specific means. Thus the diamonds give a sense of women’s share of total 
consumption in an “average” couple in each country. The vertical distance between the circles 
and triangles give, for each country, a sense of the responsiveness of the sharing rule to the 
female income share (with a greater vertical distance indicating a more responsive sharing rule). 
The figure exhibits considerable variability across country in the share of an “average” couples’ 
total consumption that is enjoyed by the female partner. There are also considerable differences 
in the responsiveness of that share to the fraction of household income that is contributed by the 
female partner. For example, the estimated female share of total consumption is lowest in 
Denmark, Spain and the U.K. However, only in the U.K is it less than one half (when evaluated 
at the means of the data.) Our estimates suggest that Denmark, Spain and France are countries 
where the sharing to rule is most sensitive to the fraction of household income that is contributed 
by the female partner. 
  To summarize, our preferred estimates are those that use the Chamberlain-Mundlak 
procedure to allow for some correlation between unobserved individual heterogeneity and 
observable characteristics (notably cohabitation status). Both these estimates and our base 
estimates suggest that cohabitating individuals enjoy returns to scale in consumption that are 
towards the larger end of the range of estimates reported in the literature (or equivalently that the 
implied equivalence scale is towards the smaller end of the range of plausible values). They also 
suggest that, in most of the countries we study, the share of household income provided by the 
female partner is a significant determinant of her share of household consumption.  24 
6. Application to Inequality Measurement 
 
One application of our estimates is the measurement of inequality. The typical approach is 
to calculate an inequality measure (for example the Gini index) at the individual level. 
Individuals are assigned the “equivalent income” of their household, which is just household 
income adjusted by an equivalence scale.  Implicitly or explicitly, such analyses assume equal 
allocations within households. Inequality studies that account for intra-household inequality with 
direct evidence on individual consumption are very rare.
14  
In principal, knowledge of the returns to scale and sharing rule parameters allow for the 
calculation of individual consumption, and hence, an examination of individual inequality 
without the assumption of equal intra-household allocations. An early paper exploiting this idea 
is Phipps and Burton (1995), who explore the sensitivity of Canadian poverty statistics to 
alternative assumptions about sharing rule and returns to scale parameters. More recently, Lise 
and Seitz (2004) estimate a collective model on U.K. data, use the estimates to calculate 
individual consumptions and then study the evolution of individual consumption inequality in the 
U.K. They conclude that failure to account for unequal intra-household allocations leads one to 
overestimate the growth in inequality since the 1970s. One possible concern with this important 
paper is the assumptions they make in order to estimate parameters of the collective model. In 
particular, they assume that leisure is an assignable good. Our estimates allow the calculation 
(from equation (8)) of a private consumption measure that allows for both returns to scale in 
consumption and unequal intra-household allocation. Of course, our private consumption 
measure also depends on the (different) assumptions we make to identify sharing rule and returns 
to scale parameters.   
                                                 
14 Haddad and Kanbar (1990) is one well-known study using Philippine data.  
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To illustrate, we calculated Gini coefficients for individual inequality among singles and 
couples in our ten countries for 2001. These are displayed in Figure 4. We calculate Gini-
coefficients for three measures of individual resources. First is equivalised income, where we use 
the common  n equivalence scale (so each single person is assumed to consume their net income, 
and each member of a couple is assumed to enjoy consumption of 1/ 2 70% ≈ of household net 
income.) This quantity is measured on the horizontal axis in Figure 4. Next, we use our (country-
specific) estimates of returns to scale and sharing rule parameters to calculate personal 
consumption for each person in our data (using Equations 3 and 5 for singles and couples 
respectively). In Figure 4, the Gini for personal consumption is plotted against the Gini for 
equivalized income with squares (so that former is read off the y-axis and the latter is read off the 
x-axis). The square for each country is labeled with the country’s acronym. The difference 
between these two Ginis is the vertical distance of the relevant square from the 45 degree line. In 
Figure 4, all of the squares lie above the 45 degree line, indicating that, in every country, personal 
consumption is more inequitably distributed than equivalent income. In some cases the 
differences are very small (for example, the U.K and Greece) while in other cases they are larger 
(for example, Denmark and the Netherlands). Changing the measure of individual resources from 
equivalent income to personal consumption leads to only small changes in the rank ordering of 
countries. There are reversals in the relative positions of Denmark and the Netherlands, Italy and 
France, and Belgium and Greece; but there are no large changes in position.  
Personal consumption, as we calculate it, differs from equivalent income both because we 
allow for inequitable allocation of consumption within couples and because we use country-
specific estimated equivalent scales rather than  n . The choice of equivalence scale can have a 
significant impact on the amount of “between-group” inequality (between singles and couples.) 26 
To decompose the effects of these two changes, we calculate, for each individual, an 
“intermediate case”. To do this, we return to the minimum-distance step that recovers the 




A =≈. We then use this 
value of  A  (in every country) and the corresponding (country-specific) restricted estimates of 
the sharing rule parameters to calculate the “intermediate case” resource measure for every 
individual in every country.
15 
Country-specific Gini coefficients for this “intermediate case” are also plotted against 
Gini coefficients for equivalent income in Figure 4, with this combination plotted as circles. Thus 
the figure can be read as follows: for each country, the vertical distance from the 45 degree line to 
the circle gives the increase in measured inequality that results from accounting for intra-
household inequality but using a standard ( n ) equivalence scale. The vertical distance from the 
circle to the square gives the additional increment in inequality that results from also using the 
country-specific estimate of the equivalence scale (i.e., the equivalence scale implied by the 
country-specific estimates of the returns to scale parameter,  A). An examination of Figure 4 
reveals that in most countries, the two changes contribute roughly equally to the increase in 
inequality (if any) as one moves from equivalised income to personal consumption. The 
exception is Belgium, where using the estimated equivalent scale has no effect, while accounting 
for intra-household inequality has a substantial impact. 
                                                 
15 The restricted estimates of the structural parameters are those values of the structural 
parameters that minimize the relevant distance given the restriction on the parameter  A. 27 
7.  Conclusion 
 
In this paper we have used survey data on financial satisfaction to estimate a collective 
household model. The parameters of interest are the household consumption technology (returns 
to scale in consumption) and the parameters of a sharing rule that determines the allocation of 
resources within households. 
Estimation of the model delivers plausible estimates of the returns to scale in household 
consumption. We also find significant effects of female income shares on the sharing rule, in the 
majority of countries. This is evidence against the unitary model and emphasizes the importance 
of modeling intra-household allocation. 
Our results add to the existing literature on collective intra-household models at least two 
ways. First, our approach uses a different kind of data, and in particular different identifying 
assumptions. Thus, the range of evidence against the unitary model is expanded, as is the set of 
alternatives for researchers wishing to estimate collective models. Some of the assumptions made 
in the previous literature are quite strong (for example, that non-market time is private leisure), so 
that alternative identification strategies (even if they involve different strong assumptions) are 
very useful. 
The second virtue of our approach is that is computationally very straight forward and the 
data requirements are quite modest. This opens up possibilities for the wide use of these kinds of 
estimates. We were able to generate estimates of sharing rule parameters and the returns to scale 
in household consumption for ten European countries. We illustrated how these estimates could 
be used to conduct international inequality comparisons that account intra-household allocation. 
A second line of possible research is to relate differences in sharing rule parameters across 
countries to institutions such as divorce law. This would build on research based on U.S. data by 28 
Gray (1998) and Chiappori et al., (2002). Because our methodology can generate sharing rule 
estimates for many jurisdictions, it expands the range of institutional factors that can be studied. 
A surprising feature of our results is that the sharing rule in most countries favours 
women, in the sense that at average household income and an average female share of income, 
the female share of a couple’s total consumption is greater than one half. This is, in fact, 
consistent with earlier work, including BCL and Lise and Seitz (2004). In BCL’s analysis this 
finding reflects the fact that couples’ spending patterns more closely resemble the spending 
patterns of single women than the spending patterns of single men. In the case of Lise and Seitz it 
may reflect the fact that non-market time is interpreted as an assignable good (of which women 
enjoy more). In our analysis, the same finding reflects a third distinct data feature. In particular, it 
seems that, holding per capita income constant, both men and women experience greater financial 
satisfaction if cohabiting, but the increment for women is larger. Our structural model interprets 
the increment in financial satisfaction from cohabiting that is common to men and women as 
returns to scale to in consumption. It attributes the gender differential in this increment to the 
sharing rule. Since the increment is larger for women, the estimated sharing rule favours them in 
the sense described above. 
It is surprising that collective models estimated in such different ways should all indicate 
that sharing rules favour women – most researchers’ prior would probably be the opposite. 
Understanding these findings is an obvious priority for future research.  
Another important avenue for future research – and one that may help resolve the puzzle 
just noted – is to incorporate subjective information on satisfaction with other life domains (such 
as time, stress and health.) Aggregating information on satisfaction in multiple domains poses 
additional, difficult, methodological problems, and we reserve this for future work. 29 
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 In the paper, the following relation between the reduced form and structural parameters has been 
derived (country index suppressed, up to now we assume that that the structural parameters are 































































The reduced parameter vector  ii i
17 ( ,..., )' π ππ =  has been estimated by means of pooled ordered 
probit. Notice that i 2 /1 j j ζ π πσ =+ ) where 
2
ζ σ  is the variance of the random effect, cf. equation 
(17). In other words, we have  i
^
π  and the estimated covariance matrix  i
^ ^
() V π . For estimation 
purposes, it is handy to rewrite the system above and obtain an alternative reduced form 
parameter vector
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From this set of equations it becomes clear that the parameterβ  cannot be identified. However, 
the parameter 
* β  (=
2 /1 ζ β σ + ) can be estimated. Given  i
^
π , consistent estimates for 
* π  can be 
obtained in a trivial way. The variance covariance matrix of 
^
* π , 
^ ^
* () V π  can be obtained in the 
following way: 
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Table 1: Distribution of Financial Satisfaction,  
by Country, Gender and Cohabiting, 
Singles and Couples (no children), ECHP 1994-2001 
(column %) 






   Netherlands 
1. very dissatisfied  3.7  5.8  1.2  1.0 
2.  dissatisfied  7.4 9.6 2.7  2.3 
3. A bit dissatisfied  13.3  16.7  8.0  7.2 
4. A bit satisfied  24.7  26.0  23.7  20.7 
5.  Satisfied  35.9 29.7 44.4  45.2 
6. Very satisfied  14.9  12.2  19.9  23.7 
no. obs  3,991 6,220 10,749 10,747 
 United  Kingdom 
1. finding it very difficult  3.0  3.0  1.2  1.1 
2. finding it quite difficult  7.3  6.3  2.9  3.3 
3. just about getting by   25.8  29.7   22.9  19.7 
4.  doing  alright  31.9 31.3 32.3  34.9 
5. living Comfortably  31.9  29.7  40.7  41.0 
no. obs  3,777 6,071 9,308 9,318 
 Spain 
1. very dissatisfied  10.4  14.7  9.1  9.8 
2.  dissatisfied  15.8 20.9 16.3  16.8 
3. A bit dissatisfied  22.4  24.5  24.9  24.5 
4. A bit satisfied  24.0  21.2  25.3  24.5 
5.  Satisfied  20.7 14.4 19.4  19.1 
6. Very satisfied  6.8  4.3  5.0  5.4 
no. obs  2,271 4,473 8,834 8,867 
 
χ
2  Tests of Independence: 
Single men versus single women rejects in all countries 
Single men versus cohabiting men rejects in all countries 
Cohabiting men versus cohabiting women does not reject in Spain 35 
Table 2: Within-Household Patterns of Financial Satisfaction  
Couples (no children), ECHP 1994-2001 
 
Netherlands 
(n=10,737, Row %) 
  Female partner   
Male partner  1 2 3 4 5 6  Total 
1.  Very  dissatisfied  41.6 22.4 17.6 10.4  6.4  1.6  100 
2. dissatisfied  7.9  33.5  30.7  16.7  8.2  3.1  100 
3. a bit dissatisfied  2.3  7.3  36.2  34.5  17.3  2.4  100 
4. a bit satisfied  0.3  1.2  9.4  44.6  38.6  5.9  100 
5.  satisfied  0.1  0.4  2.0  13.9 66.4 17.4  100 
6.  Very  satisfied  0.0 0.1 0.7 3.3  24.5    100 
 
United Kingdom 
(n=9,298) (Row %) 
  Female partner   
Male partner  1 2 3 4 5    Total 
1. finding it very difficult  30.6 31.5 27.0 10.8  0    100 
2. finding it quite difficult  9.9  37.4  37.7  12.8  2.2    100 
3. just about getting by   1.5  5.7  54.1  27.9  10.8    100 
4. doing alright  0.1  1.4  13.3  56.1  29.2    100 
5.  living  Comfortably  0.1 0.3 3.9  24.2  71.5    100 
Spain 
(n=8,782) (Row %) 
  Female partner   
Male partner  1 2 3 4 5 6  Total 
1.  Very  dissatisfied  60.4  21.2  10.8  4.3 2.3 1.1 100 
2.  dissatisfied  13.6  49.4  22.4  9.6 4.1 1.0 100 
3. a bit dissatisfied  4.5  17.5  49.9  19.4  7.6  1.0  100 
4. a bit satisfied  2.7  7.0  21.6  49.1  17.2  2.4  100 
5. satisfied  1.1  3.4  9.0  24.7  54.6  7.2  100 
6.  Very  satisfied  0.7 1.8 3.9 7.1  29.5  57.1 100 
Kappa Statistics 
 Expected 




Netherlands  30.4 58.6  0.41  (0.006) 
United Kingdom  32.6 61.1  0.42  (0.007) 
Spain  19.9 51.8  0.40  (0.005) 36 
Table 3: Changes in Financial Satisfaction 
Singles and Couples (no children), ECHP 1994-2001 
 
Note: change in satisfaction >=2 means considerable improvement, <=-2 means considerable 
deterioration 
Netherlands 
 (column %) 



















<=-2  5.1 7.9 8.7 4.0    5.8 3.3  16.9  3.6 
-1  19.0 17.9 30.2 18.5    19.7 10.8 27.9 18.4 
0  46.8 40.0 36.5 52.1    43.8 31.7 37.2 53.7 
1  21.2 17.9 16.7 20.6    23.0 29.2 12.6 20.1 
>=2  7.9 16.4 7.9  4.8    7.7 25.0 5.5  4.2 
Obs.  2,891 140 126 7,971 4,704 120 183 7,966
 
United Kingdom 
 (column %) 



















<=-2  3.5 2.9 8.9 2.9    3.7 2.2 7.9 2.8 
-1  16.2 14.3 23.1 15.5    16.7 16.4 28.3 15.0 
0  57.5 43.6 42.0 60.2    54.1 36.6 42.9 61.2 
1  18.4 30.0 18.9 17.8    20.3 30.6 17.3 17.4 
>=2  4.4 9.3 7.1 3.7    5.21  14.2  3.7 3.6 
Obs.  2,743 140 169 7,150 4,741 134 191 7,168
 
 Spain 
 (column %) 



















<=-2  13.6 13.3  5.2  12.6    13.2 15.8 28.7 12.9 
-1  20.0 22.2 26.0 21.3    21.3 15.8 24.3 21.3 
0  31.7 20.0 39.0 30.2    30.0 29.0 19.9 30.1 
1  20.0 26.7 11.7 21.8    21.5 23.7 13.2 20.8 
>=2  14.8 17.8 18.2 14.1    14.0 15.8 14.0 14.9 
Obs. 1,621  45  77 6,403 3,401 38  136 6,433
 
Test of Gender Equality 
(p-values) 
 S-P P-S 
Netherlands  0.020 0.246 
United Kingdom  0.635 0.523 
Spain  0.856 <0.001 37 
Table 4: Selected Means, by Country 
Singles and Couples (no children), ECHP 1994-2001 
 
 ln  real  household 
income at PPP   
Female income share 
(Couples only) 
Denmark 9.74  0.41 
Netherlands 9.81  0.29 
Belgium 9.74  0.27 
France 9.72  0.30 
Ireland 9.46  0.27 
Italy 9.49  0.29 
Greece 8.98  0.24 
Spain 9.31  0.20 
Portugal 8.88  0.32 
United Kingdom  9.74  0.37 
Notes: Household income is the sum of personal incomes. Personal income is net, 
and is the sum all income components, over the year preceding the survey. 
 
 38 
Table 5a: Reduced Form Parameter Estimates,  Base Specification 
  DK NL BE FR IE IT GR ES PT UK 
Ln(incomeit)  (
1 π )  0.374*** 0.374*** 0.374*** 0.374*** 0.374*** 0.374*** 0.374*** 0.374*** 0.374*** 0.374*** 
  (-0.044) (-0.044) (-0.044) (-0.044) (-0.044) (-0.044) (-0.044) (-0.044) (-0.044) (-0.044) 
Coupleit (
2 π )  -0.068 -0.068 -0.068 -0.068 -0.068 -0.068 -0.068 -0.068 -0.068 -0.068 
  (-0.047) (-0.047) (-0.047) (-0.047) (-0.047) (-0.047) (-0.047) (-0.047) (-0.047) (-0.047) 
Coupleit*femaleit (
3 π )  0.259*** 0.259*** 0.259*** 0.259*** 0.259*** 0.259*** 0.259*** 0.259*** 0.259*** 0.259*** 
  (-0.063) (-0.063) (-0.063) (-0.063) (-0.063) (-0.063) (-0.063) (-0.063) (-0.063) (-0.063) 
Couple*female*ln(income) (
4 π )  0.155** 0.155** 0.155** 0.155** 0.155** 0.155** 0.155** 0.155** 0.155** 0.155** 
  (-0.063) (-0.063) (-0.063) (-0.063) (-0.063) (-0.063) (-0.063) (-0.063) (-0.063) (-0.063) 
Coupleit*femalei*income_share_femaleit (
4 π ) -0.347** -0.347** -0.347** -0.347** -0.347** -0.347** -0.347** -0.347** -0.347** -0.347** 
  (-0.14) (-0.14) (-0.14) (-0.14) (-0.14) (-0.14) (-0.14) (-0.14) (-0.14) (-0.14) 
Coupleit*malei*ln(incomeit) (
6 π )  0.285*** 0.285*** 0.285*** 0.285*** 0.285*** 0.285*** 0.285*** 0.285*** 0.285*** 0.285*** 
  (-0.064) (-0.064) (-0.064) (-0.064) (-0.064) (-0.064) (-0.064) (-0.064) (-0.064) (-0.064) 
Coupleit*malei*income_share_femaleit (
7 π )  -0.772*** -0.772*** -0.772*** -0.772*** -0.772*** -0.772*** -0.772*** -0.772*** -0.772*** -0.772*** 
  (-0.14) (-0.14) (-0.14) (-0.14) (-0.14) (-0.14) (-0.14) (-0.14) (-0.14) (-0.14) 
Femalei  -0.117** -0.117** -0.117** -0.117** -0.117** -0.117** -0.117** -0.117** -0.117** -0.117** 
  (-0.048) (-0.048) (-0.048) (-0.048) (-0.048) (-0.048) (-0.048) (-0.048) (-0.048) (-0.048) 
(Upper) secondary educationi  0.0582 0.0582 0.0582 0.0582 0.0582 0.0582 0.0582 0.0582 0.0582 0.0582 
  (-0.037) (-0.037) (-0.037) (-0.037) (-0.037) (-0.037) (-0.037) (-0.037) (-0.037) (-0.037) 
Post secondary educationi  0.00781 0.00781 0.00781 0.00781 0.00781 0.00781 0.00781 0.00781 0.00781 0.00781 
  (-0.033) (-0.033) (-0.033) (-0.033) (-0.033) (-0.033) (-0.033) (-0.033) (-0.033) (-0.033) 
Ageit  -0.0116** -0.0116** -0.0116** -0.0116** -0.0116** -0.0116** -0.0116** -0.0116** -0.0116** -0.0116** 
  (-0.0046) (-0.0046) (-0.0046) (-0.0046) (-0.0046) (-0.0046) (-0.0046) (-0.0046) (-0.0046) (-0.0046) 
2
it Age   0.000334***0.000334***0.000334***0.000334*** 0.000334***0.000334***0.000334***0.000334***0.000334***0.000334*** 
  (-4.6E-05) (-4.6E-05) (-4.6E-05) (-4.6E-05) (-4.6E-05) (-4.6E-05) (-4.6E-05) (-4.6E-05) (-4.6E-05) (-4.6E-05) 
Observations  18751 18751 18751 18751 18751 18751 18751 18751 18751 18751 
Notes: Specification also contains time dummies; Standard errors in parentheses; Standard errors account for clustering; 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Estimation method: Pooled Ordered Probit. 39 
Table 5b: Structural Parameter Estimates, Base Specification 
  DK NL BE FR IE  IT  GR ES PT UK 
Sharing Rule Parameters 
Intercept  0.340** 0.519***  0.627*** 0.261**  0.329**  0.171*  0.146*  0.379*** 0.242**  0.144 
(
0 γ )  (0.17) (0.10) (0.21) (0.12) (0.17)  (0.089)  (0.076)  (0.13) (0.11) (0.13) 
Ln(income)  -0.410**  -0.0862 -0.0704 -0.0505 0.0398 -0.0769 -0.0689 -0.258* -0.0422  -0.236** 
(
1 γ )  (0.17) (0.10) (0.19) (0.11) (0.16)  (0.070)  (0.045)  (0.14)  (0.071)  (0.12) 
Female Income Share  1.693***  0.298  0.289  0.808***  0.0799  0.422**  0.405***  0.822***  1.008***  0.721** 
(
2 γ )  (0.56) (0.22) (0.39) (0.29) (0.34) (0.17) (0.12) (0.27) (0.22) (0.33) 
Household Consumption Technology (returns to scale parameter) 
(Given equal allocation, the equivalence scale is 2A) 
A  0.459*** 0.346*** 0.292*** 0.456*** 0.605*** 0.551*** 0.659*** 0.539*** 0.767*** 0.526*** 
  (0.045) (0.023) (0.036) (0.030) (0.053) (0.025) (0.026) (0.040) (0.042) (0.038) 
Estimated Female Consumption Shares, Mean Household Income and Alternative Female Income Shares 
1(ln( ),0.25) y η   0.517*** 0.624*** 0.651*** 0.556*** 0.581*** 0.538*** 0.537*** 0.603*** 0.543*** 0.515*** 
  (0.054) (0.025) (0.048) (0.030) (0.041) (0.022) (0.019) (0.031) (0.028) (0.036) 
1(ln( ),0.50) y η   0.621*** 0.641*** 0.667*** 0.605*** 0.586*** 0.564*** 0.562*** 0.651*** 0.605*** 0.560*** 
  (0.036) (0.024) (0.048) (0.027) (0.039) (0.023) (0.019) (0.031) (0.023) (0.029) 
1(ln( ),0.75) y η   0.714*** 0.658*** 0.683*** 0.652*** 0.591*** 0.590*** 0.587*** 0.696*** 0.663*** 0.603*** 
  (0.041) (0.029) (0.056) (0.033) (0.047) (0.028) (0.021) (0.037) (0.025) (0.035) 
1(ln( ), ) y w η   0.584*** 0.627*** 0.652*** 0.565*** 0.582*** 0.543*** 0.536*** 0.594*** 0.560*** 0.536*** 
  (0.041) (0.024) (0.048) (0.029) (0.040) (0.022) (0.019) (0.032) (0.027) (0.031) 
Overidentification test 
-p  value  0.000 0.000 0.133 0.000 0.003 0.043 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 40 
Table 6a: Reduced Form Parameter Estimates, Chamberlain/Mundlak Estimator 
  DK NL BE FR IE IT GR ES PT UK 
Ln(incomeit)  (
1 π )  0.376*** 0.488*** 0.370*** 0.401*** 0.519***  0.608*** 0.747*** 0.366*** 0.573*** 0.426*** 
  (-0.044) (-0.032) (-0.048) (-0.028) (-0.061)  (-0.035)  (-0.032)  (-0.033 (-0.035)  (-0.03) 
Coupleit (
2 π )  -0.0739 -0.135** -0.0495  -0.199***  -0.650***  -0.163**  -0.293*** -0.154*  -0.359***  -0.192*** 
  (-0.067) (-0.068) (-0.087) (-0.055)  (-0.13) (-0.078)  (-0.088)  (-0.084 (-0.094) (-0.059) 
Coupleit*femaleit (
3 π )  0.116 0.305*** 0.119  0.192**  0.545***  0.173  -0.0053  0.195* 0.048  0.108 
  (-0.09) (-0.091) (-0.13) (-0.078) (-0.16) (-0.11)  (-0.11) (-0.12 (-0.12) (-0.084) 
Couple*female*ln(income) (
4 π )  0.151** 0.193*** -0.0273 0.136***  0.02  -0.0216  -0.0277  0.205*** -0.0595 0.275*** 
  (-0.063) (-0.051) (-0.066) (-0.043) (-0.083)  (-0.045)  (-0.038)  (-0.048 (-0.044) (-0.045) 
Coupleit*femalei*income_share_femaleit (
4 π )  -0.337** -0.244***  -0.15  -0.162** -0.390*** -0.0261 -0.145** -0.135* -0.315*** -0.198** 
  (-0.14) (-0.083) (-0.11) (-0.081) (-0.12)  (-0.075)  (-0.064)  (-0.072  (-0.084)  (-0.099) 
Coupleit*malei*ln(incomeit) (
6 π )  0.285***  0.168*** 0.0105 0.123*** 0.0281 0.0219 0.027  0.216*** -0.0104 0.297*** 
  (-0.064) (-0.049) (-0.067) (-0.041) (-0.084)  (-0.045)  (-0.037)  (-0.049 (-0.043) (-0.045) 
Coupleit*malei*income_share_femaleit (
7 π )  -0.772*** -0.219***  -0.157  -0.428***  -0.239* -0.247*** -0.426*** -0.343*** -0.784*** -0.407*** 
 (-0.14)  (-0.08)  (-0.11)  (-0.079)  (-0.13)  (-0.071)  (-0.064)  (-0.071  (-0.082)  (-0.096) 
Femalei  -0.129** -0.213*** -0.135**  -0.101**  -0.127* -0.114**  -0.133**  -0.236*** -0.229***  -0.0952** 
  (-0.051) (-0.044) (-0.062) (-0.041) (-0.069)  (-0.049)  (-0.056)  (-0.047 (-0.057) (-0.048) 
(Upper) secondary educationi  0.0596  0.253*** 0.369*** 0.295*** 0.343***  0.410*** 0.343*** 0.347*** 0.252*** 0.233*** 
  (-0.037)  (-0.034)  (-0.044) (-0.03) (-0.061)  (-0.049)  (-0.042)  (-0.034  (-0.064) (-0.03) 
Post secondary educationi  0.00821 0.144***  0.141***  0.0962***  0.209***  0.270*** 0.340*** 0.209*** 0.144*** 0.195*** 
  (-0.033) (-0.028) (-0.035) (-0.025) (-0.045)  (-0.028)  (-0.035)  (-0.033 (-0.053) (-0.033) 
Ageit  -0.0119** -0.0243*** -0.00952* -0.0242***  -0.0283*** 0.00922** 0.00122  0.00438 -0.0112*** -0.0278*** 
  (-0.0046) (-0.0042) (-0.0054) (-0.0035) (-0.0064)  (-0.0041) (-0.0041) (-0.0038 (-0.0042) (-0.0039) 
2
it Age   0.000337***0.000305***0.000248***0.000324*** 0.000423*** -5.9E-05 1.11E-05 3.99E-05  0.0000946**0.000365*** 
  (-4.6E-05) (-4.1E-05) (-5.1E-05) (-3.4E-05) (-6.1E-05)  (-3.8E-05) (-3.6E-05) (-3.6E-05 (-3.9E-05) (-3.8E-05) 
i Couple   0.00562 0.160**  0.113  0.208***  0.433***  0.0584 0.0623  -0.0381 0.0705  0.139* 
  (-0.078)  (-0.076) (-0.1) (-0.064)  (-0.14)  (-0.088)  (-0.1)  (-0.092  (-0.11)  (-0.073) 
i Couple*female   0.163 0.0563 0.139 -0.0609  -0.276  -0.0857  0.108  0.0578  0.0944  0.0751 
  (-0.11) (-0.1) (-0.15)  (-0.089)  (-0.18)  (-0.12)  (-0.13)  (-0.13  (-0.13) (-0.1) 
Joint Statistical significance, Mundlak terms - 
p  value  0.077 0.001 0.039  0  0.003  0.761  0.088  0.894  0.1  0.002 
Observations  18751  31346  15793  35717  9243  23564 21598 24434  22276  28011 
Notes: Specification also contains time dummies; Robust standard errors in parentheses; Standard errors account for clustering; 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; 41 
 
Table 6b: Structural Parameter Estimates, Chamberlain/Mundlak Estimator 
  DK NL BE FR IE  IT  GR ES  PT  UK 
Sharing Rule Parameters 
Intercept 0.0833  0.240  0.213  0.219  0.472*  0.323*  0.192  0.0390  0.457**  -0.0406 
(
0 γ )  (0.24) (0.17) (0.36) (0.19) (0.26) (0.17) (0.15) (0.28) (0.20) (0.19) 
Ln(income)  -0.372* -0.155 -0.0908 -0.115 0.00175  -0.0766  -0.0736*  -0.356*  -0.0754 -0.255 
(
1 γ )  (0.21) (0.12) (0.19) (0.12) (0.16) (0.070)  (0.045)  (0.20)  (0.071)  (0.16) 
Female Income 
Share 
1.288** 0.375  0.217  1.008***  0.422 0.436**  0.289**  0.919***  0.542* 0.691* 
(
2 γ )  (0.64) (0.23) (0.43) (0.30) (0.33) (0.17) (0.13) (0.31) (0.28) (0.36) 
Household Consumption Technology (returns to scale parameter) 
(Given equal allocation, the equivalence scale is 2A) 
A  0.595*** 0.477*** 0.487*** 0.632*** 0.766*** 0.566*** 0.778*** 0.565*** 1.003*** 0.689*** 
  (0.074) (0.049) (0.088) (0.062)  (0.14)  (0.050) (0.060) (0.094)  (0.10)  (0.068) 
Estimated Female Consumption Shares, Mean Household Income and Alternative Female Income Shares 
1(ln( ),0.25) y η   0.469*** 0.556*** 0.552*** 0.543*** 0.614*** 0.575*** 0.548*** 0.521*** 0.604*** 0.470*** 
  (0.077) (0.043) (0.089) (0.048) (0.063) (0.043) (0.037) (0.067) (0.051) (0.053) 
1(ln( ),0.50) y η   0.550*** 0.579*** 0.566*** 0.604*** 0.638*** 0.602*** 0.566*** 0.578*** 0.636*** 0.513*** 
  (0.053) (0.039) (0.083) (0.040) (0.056) (0.041) (0.033) (0.059) (0.039) (0.044) 
1(ln( ),0.75) y η   0.628*** 0.602*** 0.579*** 0.663*** 0.662*** 0.627*** 0.584*** 0.633*** 0.666*** 0.556*** 
  (0.051) (0.039) (0.085) (0.039) (0.056) (0.041) (0.032) (0.055) (0.032) (0.044) 
1(ln( ), ) y w η   0.521*** 0.560*** 0.553*** 0.555*** 0.616*** 0.580*** 0.548*** 0.510*** 0.612*** 0.490*** 
  (0.060) (0.042) (0.089) (0.046) (0.062) (0.043) (0.037) (0.069) (0.047) (0.048) 
Overidentification 
test  p  value  0.000 0.000 0.138 0.000 0.022 0.062 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 






Figure 1: Estimates of the Returns to Scale in Household Consumption, 
Base Estimates, 
10 European Countries, 1994-2001 
 
Explanation; Country-specific estimates of  A and associated confidences intervals. A value of 0.5 indicates that a 
couple’s potential total consumption is double their income; this in turn implies that all consumption is public. A 
value of 1 indicates no returns to scale; all consumption is private. A traditional “equivalence scale” is obtained by 
multiplying the parameter  A by two. This gives the value by which a couple’s income should be divided to give 
the income that a single person would require to have the same per capita total consumption. These estimates 
correspond to our base specification (Equation 14 in the text). 43 
Figure 2: Estimates of the Returns to Scale in Household Consumption, 
Chamberlain/Mundlak Estimator, 
10 European Countries, 1994-2001 
 
 
Explanation: Same as Figure 1 except that these estimates come from our second (“Chamberlain/Mundlak”) 
specification. That specification includes person specific means of explanatory variables to control for potential 
correlation between those variables and time-invariant, unobserved individual effects. (See Equations 16 and 17 in 
the text.)44 
Figure 3: Estimates of the Female Share of a Couple’s Total Consumption, 
10 European Countries, 1994-2001 
 
 
Explanation: Countries are arrayed along the horizontal axis. The female share of a couple’s total consumption is 
measured on the vertical axis. This is calculated in three ways, all employing country-specific estimates of the 
sharing rule parameters. First, we assume that the female contributes 25 percentage of household income (plotted 
as a circle.); second, we assume that the female contributes 75 percent of household income (plotted as a triangle); 
and finally, we set the female contribution to household income equal to the country mean (plotted as a diamond). 
In all three cases, household income is set to the country specific means. Thus the diamonds give a sense of 
women’s share of total consumption in an “average” couple in each country. The vertical distance between the 
circles and triangles give, for each country, a sense of the responsiveness of the sharing rule to the female income 
share (with a greater vertical distance indicating a more responsive sharing rule). 
 45 
Figure 4: Inequality in Equivalent Income and Personal Consumption, 
10 European Countries, 2001 
 
 
Explanation: The Gini for personal consumption is plotted against the Gini for equiavlized income with 
squares (so that former is read off the y-axis and the latter is read off the x-axis). The square for each country is 
labeled with the country’s acronym. The difference between these two Gini’s is the vertical distance of the relevant 
square from the 45 degree line. Personal consumption, differs from equivalent income both because we allow for 
inequitable allocation of consumption within couples and because we use country-specific estimated equivalent 
scales rather than  n . To decompose the effects of these two changes, we calculate, for each individual, an 
“intermediate case” by imposing the  n  equivalence scale when we estimate our model (but allowing the data to 
determine sharing rule parameters, given this restriction.) Country-specific Gini coefficients for this “intermediate 
case” are also plotted against Gini coefficients for equivalent income in Figure 4, with this combination plotted as 
circles. Thus the figure can be read as follows: for each country, the vertical distance from the 45 degree line to the 
circle gives the increase in measured inequality that results from accounting for intra-household inequality but 
using a standard ( n ) equivalence scale. The vertical distance from the circle to the square gives the additional 
increment in inequality that results from also using the country-specific estimate of the equivalence scale (ie., the 
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